World Immigration News

Electoral systems and immigration policies

Release Date: 2026-01-13
Media: CEPR
Summary: The column argues that differences in immigration policy across democracies are shaped not only by voter preferences but also by electoral rules, especially when immigration becomes a highly salient political issue. It distinguishes between systems where power can be won with a simple plurality of votes and systems that require an absolute majority, such as proportional representation or two-round (dual-ballot) elections.

Using Italian municipal elections from 1993 to 2012, the authors exploit a rule that switches mayoral elections from plurality to a two-round system when a municipality’s population exceeds 15,000. They find that moving to a majority-required system reduces the entry of stand-alone anti-immigrant candidates and increases the likelihood that anti-immigrant parties join broader coalitions with more moderate center-right forces.

The policy consequences follow the same pattern. Municipalities using the two-round system are more likely to provide migration-related services and spend more on migrant-targeted welfare and related programs. The effects are strongest where anti-immigration sentiment is substantial but below 50%, because plurality rules allow anti-immigrant candidates to win without majority support, while majority rules force coalition-building and moderation.

The authors conclude that, as identity-driven issues like immigration increasingly dominate political competition, institutional design remains a key driver of whether countries adopt more restrictive or more open immigration policies.
Tags: Italy

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