[Blog]When --Five Years-- Is Too Much: Residence Periods, Individual Choice, and the Balanced Coexistence Model

2026-10-07

On October 1, 2026, Japan significantly changed its fee structure for applications to change or extend a status of residence. Instead of a largely uniform fee system, the amount payable now varies according to the period of stay granted. In my previous article, “If I Do Not Need Five Years, Can I Choose One? The Missing Element of Individual Choice in Japan’s New Residence Fee System,” I raised a simple question: even if the Immigration Services Agency is prepared to grant a five-year period of stay, should an applicant who, for financial or other personal reasons, prefers only one year really have no option to choose the shorter period?

This Is Not Simply a Question of Higher Fees

It would be easy to frame this issue simply as a debate over whether immigration fees have become too expensive. From the perspective of the Balanced Coexistence Model, however, the more fundamental question is how much room should be given to individual choice when an administrative authority determines both the period of residence and, indirectly, the financial burden imposed on the individual. An applicant may request five years, but requesting five years does not guarantee that five years will be granted. The authority may instead grant three years or one year. Conversely, if five years are granted, the applicant may become liable for a higher fee than anticipated. At the time of application, therefore, the individual cannot know with certainty either the period that will ultimately be granted or the final amount that will have to be paid. This structure differs significantly from an ordinary transaction in which a person knows the price before deciding whether to purchase a product or service.

The Balanced Coexistence Model Does Not Mean Being “Soft” on Immigration

The Balanced Coexistence Model that I propose is not a framework designed simply to maximize the rights or interests of foreign nationals. The state has both the authority and the responsibility to determine who may enter, under what conditions residence should be permitted, and for how long a person may remain. Appropriate controls against unlawful residence, unauthorized employment, and abuse of immigration systems are also necessary. The fact that the government ultimately determines the period of stay is therefore not, in itself, inconsistent with the Balanced Coexistence Model. The real question is whether strong administrative authority is accompanied by sufficient explainability, predictability, and meaningful opportunities for individual choice. State control and individual dignity should not be treated as mutually exclusive values. Constructing an institutional balance between them is one of the central objectives of the Balanced Coexistence Model.

When Administrative Discretion Also Determines Financial Burden

The new system has an important structural feature: an administrative benefit—the length of the permitted period of stay—is now linked to a financial burden. A longer period of stay is generally beneficial to a foreign resident. A five-year period reduces the frequency of renewal procedures and can provide greater stability in employment and daily life. But once a longer period also carries a greater financial cost, the traditional assumption that “a longer period is always better for the applicant” no longer necessarily holds true. A person may fully qualify for a five-year period but, at the time permission is granted, be facing illness in the family, unemployment, reduced income, educational expenses for children, or other unexpected financial pressures. Such a person may reasonably conclude, “For now, one year is enough.” If the system cannot accommodate such circumstances at all, a gap may emerge between administrative rationality and the realities of people’s lives.

The Risk of Designing Systems Around the “Typical” Applicant

One principle underlying the Balanced Coexistence Model is that administrative systems should not be designed solely around an imagined “average” person. It may be true in most cases that anyone eligible for five years would prefer five years. It may also seem reasonable to say that someone who requested five years should be prepared to pay the corresponding fee. Yet the quality of an administrative system is often revealed precisely when someone falls outside these assumptions. The relevant question should not be, “Would anyone really want that?” but rather, “What does the system do if such a person actually exists?” This does not mean that every exceptional circumstance must automatically result in special treatment. It means that institutions should recognize the possibility of exceptions and establish transparent rules for dealing with them.

What Is Needed Is Not Unlimited Freedom, but Meaningful Choice

This does not mean that applicants should simply be free to select any period of stay they wish. If individuals who qualify for five years repeatedly choose one-year periods, the immigration authorities would have to conduct renewal examinations more frequently, increasing the administrative burden. From the perspective of efficiency, there is a rational basis for granting longer periods to people who clearly qualify for them. A balance is therefore required. One possible approach would be to notify an applicant of the intended period of stay and corresponding fee before final issuance and allow, under defined conditions, a request for a shorter period. Another possibility would be to make fee reductions or exemptions more accessible when genuine financial hardship exists. The important point is not that requests for shorter periods must always be accepted. Rather, the system should consider whether there can be alternatives to the binary choice of “pay the amount determined by the administrative decision or do not receive the permission.”

Explainability Creates Trust in Administration

Equally important is the explanation given when a request cannot be accommodated. If changing to a shorter period after the decision is legally or administratively impossible, the authorities should be able to explain why. There is a significant difference between saying, “The system does not permit this, for the following reasons,” and responding, in effect, “Why would anyone ask for that?” The former explains an institutional rule. The latter risks dismissing the individual circumstances of the person using the system. Trust in public administration does not arise because every request is granted. It arises when people can understand why a request is denied and can feel that their circumstances have at least been recognized within the institutional framework.

Administrative Systems Must Not Ignore What They Cannot See

Immigration authorities see applications, employment information, income, tax records, social insurance records, and immigration history. Behind those documents, however, is an individual life. People pay rent and food expenses, raise children, support family members abroad, lose jobs, change careers, become ill, and encounter unexpected financial difficulties. The circumstances that existed when an application was submitted may not be the same several months later when a decision is issued. Under the Balanced Coexistence Model, “coexistence” means more than simply allowing foreign nationals to live within society. It also requires institutions to recognize that there are limits to what administrative systems can see. Circumstances invisible to the administration do not cease to exist merely because they do not appear on an application form.

Trust in the System Ultimately Strengthens Immigration Control

This is not merely an argument for greater consideration toward foreign nationals. If a system disregards the realities faced by those who use it, provides little explanation, and offers no meaningful alternatives, distrust of the system itself will grow. By contrast, when rules are clear, administrative decisions can be understood, and reasonable procedures exist for dealing with exceptional circumstances, people are more likely to accept the legitimacy of the system. Protecting dignity and ensuring explainability therefore do not necessarily weaken state control. They can strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of that control. This is a central proposition of the Balanced Coexistence Model. A “strict system” and a “trusted system” are not opposites. Necessary regulation can coexist with transparency, procedural fairness, and respect for the individual.

Designing Institutions by Asking, “What If Such a Person Exists?”

At first glance, the question “What if I do not want five years and would prefer one?” may appear to be a minor operational issue within Japan’s immigration system. Yet behind it lies a much broader question about public administration. What the government considers beneficial for an individual does not always coincide with what that individual needs at a particular moment. When such a gap emerges, to what extent should the system recognize the person’s own wishes? And when those wishes cannot be accommodated, how clearly should the reasons be explained? The Balanced Coexistence Model does not seek a society in which every request made by a foreign national is automatically accepted, nor does it seek to weaken the legitimate authority of the state. It seeks a society in which necessary immigration control is maintained while each person is treated not merely as an “object” of administration, but as a “subject” with agency, circumstances, and a life beyond the application form. Instead of asking, “Surely nobody would want that,” we should ask, “If such a person exists, how should the system respond?” Repeatedly asking that question may be one of the most practical ways to reduce distrust and build an immigration system that both the state and foreign residents can regard as legitimate.

References

If I Do Not Need Five Years, Can I Choose One? The Missing Element of Individual Choice in Japan’s New Residence Fee System

Immigration Services Agency of Japan: Revision of Residence Permission Fees Effective October 1, 2026

Immigration Services Agency of Japan: Fee Reduction and Exemption Measures from October 1, 2026