[Blog]Trust, Stability, and Foreign Entrepreneurship: Rethinking Japan’s Business Manager Visa
2026-05-28
The Mainichi article reports that Japan’s tightened requirements for the “Business Manager” status of residence have placed many foreign entrepreneurs in a difficult position. Since October 2025, the system has raised the capital requirement from 5 million yen to 30 million yen, while also requiring at least one full-time employee and stronger evidence of business substance.
From Openness to Selective Acceptance
The reform aims to prevent abuse of the system, such as shell companies created mainly for residence purposes. In that sense, the policy reflects a legitimate concern: residence status should be connected to real economic activity, not merely formal company registration. However, the sudden increase in the threshold also risks excluding small but genuine entrepreneurs who have already invested in Japan, built local ties, and planned their lives around the former rules.
The Human Cost of Institutional Change
The article shows that immigration reform is not only a technical adjustment of screening standards. It directly affects people’s businesses, families, leases, employees, and future plans. When a residence system changes rapidly, even lawful residents may become socially unstable. A person may be legally present today but unable to renew tomorrow, not because their business is fake, but because the institutional standard has moved beyond their financial capacity.
Consistency with the Balanced Coexistence Model
From the perspective of the Balanced Coexistence Model, the reform is partly consistent and partly problematic. It is consistent because the model does not support unrestricted acceptance. A residence status should be explainable, predictable, and connected to real contribution. If the Business Manager visa is used without actual business continuity, public trust in the immigration system will decline.
Where the Reform Falls Short
At the same time, the model emphasizes that trust is built through proportionality, transition, and institutional connection. A sixfold increase in capital may be too blunt if it treats all businesses in the same way, regardless of industry, region, profitability, tax payment, employment plan, or local contribution. A small restaurant, trading company, or service business may not need 30 million yen in capital to be socially meaningful.
Toward a More Balanced Design
A more balanced system would distinguish between abusive applications and genuine small-scale entrepreneurship. Instead of relying mainly on capital size, Japan could evaluate business continuity through tax records, social insurance enrollment, actual sales, local contracts, employment growth, and professional verification. Existing residents should also receive clear transitional rules so that they can adjust without sudden collapse.
Conclusion
The Mainichi article highlights an important tension in Japan’s immigration policy: the need to protect institutional credibility while avoiding unnecessary harm to people who are already connected to Japanese society. The Balanced Coexistence Model supports stricter screening when it improves trust, but it also requires fairness, predictability, and proportionality. Immigration control should not simply raise the gate. It should design a gate that can distinguish risk from contribution.
